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ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OF INTOXICATION

AS A DEFENSE TO CRIME.
In the discussion of thf.,question it will first be
necessary to consider the elements which must be proved
in order that criminal liability may be fixed on any
person.

To constitute a crime, there must be (1) an act,

and (2) a criminal intent, or (3) criminal negligence,
(4) which must concur in point of time.
A criminal intention is the state of mind of a person when he consciously violates the law, without legal
justification or excuse.

The aim of the law in all

criminal cases, is, not the redress of a private wrong,
but the punishment of the individual committing the
crime.

This being the case it would be a great injus-

tice to punish a person for a wrongful act unless he
intended evil or was careless in what he did.

This

doctrine has been laid down in many adjudicated cases as
well as in the old maxims of the common law.
The only exceptions to this general statement are to
be found in acts made criminal by statute, and in such
cases no proof of intention need be offered.

Illustra-
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tions of such laws are found in the statutes prohibiting
the sale of intoxicating liquors to minors and also in
the sales of adulterated food.

In such cases a viola-

tion of the statute may render a person criminally liable
even though he be wholly free from moral blame.

It is

suggested however, that in each of these cases there is
ordinarily negligence, or an intention to infringe on
another's civil rights, or to do some moral wrong, any of
which might supply a criminal intent.
Criminal intent is divided into General and Specific
intent.
done.

The general intent is the intent to do the act
When one does an unlawful act, he is by law

presumed to have intended to do it, and to have intended
its natural and ordinary consequences.

This is so

because he must have foreseen the consequences which
would result from the commission of the unlawful act.
When, however, the act is not criminal in itself but
becomes so only if

done with a particular intent,

this intent must be proved.
intent.

then

This is called the Specific

For example, where the crime charged is assault

with intent to kill, or assault with intent to commit
rape, the crime is not committed unless the specific
intent charged is

proved.

In

these cases the gist of
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the crime is the intent itself

: but so long as the crime

remains a mere intention, it is not punishable ; an attempt to carry out the

intention, which falls short

its consummation, is necessary.
cussion it

of

From this brief dis-

is at once apparent that evidence of intoxica-

tion can never be admitted to disprove the general
criminal intent.
necessary element

However,

if a specific intent be a

in a particular crime, evidence of in-

toxication is admissible, to show that

such an intent

could not have been entertained, and thus to change the
nature or grade of the offence for which the prisoner
may be commited.

This is a statement of the law as it

stands at the present

time in a majority of the states.

The Roman law made great allowances for this vice
and admitted evidence of it as defence in a criminal action.

In Greece, by a law of Pittacus, it was enacted

"that he who committed a crime when drunk, should receive a double punishment,"

one for the crime itself,

and the other for the drunkenness which caused him to
commit

it.

According to Blackstone, the English law looked
upon intoxication as an aggravation of the offense,
rather than any excuse.

Lord Coke says,--"He who be-
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comes voluntarily intoxicated, hath no privilege thereby ; but what hurt or ill soever he doth, his drunkenness
doth aggravate it."

The case of Renigre vs. Zogossa,

(Plowd.19) declares "that

if a person that is drunk kills

another, this shall be felony, and he shall be hanged for
it

; and yet he did it through ignorance, for when he

was drunk he had no understanding or memory ; but inasmuch as that ignorance was occasioned by his own act
and folly, and he might have avoided it,

he shall not be

privileged thereby."
While this was the rule of the English law, the
courts established this exception.

If a man became in-

voluntarily reduced to madness by intoxication, then he
had the same defence as

in any other case of insanity.

It was also held that evidence of intoxication was admissible where it was material to inquire whether the
crime was done after deliberation or in hot blood.
The cases of Joseph Hume, decided in 1732 and Patrick
Kinninmountdecided in 1697 are among the oldest and
fully substantiate the above propositions.

Having thus

briefly passed over the introductory part of our subject,

it will be admissible to investigate the law as

found

in

New York Statethis being the generally adopted

country.

rule of this

Afterwards

it

will be interesting

to note any variance found in any of the other States
of the Union.

New York.
The law in New York State, as regards the admissibility of evidence of intoxication in criminal cases, is
of the

the law of a majority of the states

practically
Union.

One of the first

cases to be found in New York is

that of People vs. Robinson, 1 Parker's Criminal Reports,
649.

The defendant was on trial for the murder of one

Lanagan by poison.

It was proved that she administered

the poison while she was in a state of intoxication.
In the charge to the jury the judge said,--"If the accused mingled poison in the beer that was drank by
Lanagan, the law charges her with a design to kill him
and although she may have been excited by drink at the
time, even to such an extent as not to know what
doing, she must answer for the consequences.

she was

Her self-

inflicted insanity must not be allowed to avail her for
defence.
tent.

The law imputes to her still a murderous inA man may reasonably be presumed to intend to

do what he in fact does.

If it appears that the

faculties of his mind had become so disordered that he
was no longer capable of discriminating between right
and wrong in respect to the act he has committed, then
the law, in its justice, pronounces him innocent of the
crime.

But, if his derangement is voluntary ;

madness be self-invited ;

if his

the law will not hear him

when he makes his intoxication his plea to excuse him
from punishment."

The court farther appears to suggest

that if the defendant in this case, instead of drinking
enough to render her merely unconscious of what she was
doing had continued drinking and thereby brought on
delirium tremens or insanity, that then she would not be
accountable for her crime.

The court considers the

first condition a voluntary one and the second brought
about by the visitation Qf God.

At the time of this

case there was but one degree of murder in New York
State.

The prisoner was found guilty but it is certain

that a verdict of murder in the first degree could not be
rendered under a similar state of facts at the present
time.
The case of People vs. Fuller, decided in 1823, is

an extreme one.

in this case holds that

The court

in-

toxication is a voluntary deprivation of reason, and
that if a person under the influence of liquor does an
act which would be a crime if he were sober, the

intoxi-

cation is an aggravation of the offense, and cannot be
given in evidence in mitigation of the guilt of the
prisoner.
Outside of a very few exceptional cases of this
class, the
It

law in New York had always been quite settled.

is provided by Section 22 of the Penal Code that:

"No act conmitted by a person while in a state of intoxication shall be deemed less criminal by reason of his
having been in such condition.

But whenever the actual

existence of any particular purpose, motive or intent,
is a necessary element to constitute a particular species
or degree of crime, the jury may take into the

consider-

ation the fact that the accused was intoxicated at the
time,in determining the purpose, motive or intent, with
which he committed the act."
It is held in the case of People vs. Batting, (49
Howard Pr. Rep. 392), that

proof of voluntary intoxica-

tion may reduce the crime of murder to the second degree.

A deliberate

intention to kill

ure of murder in the first

is

degree.

the essential
When the mind,

featfrom

intoxication is deprived of its power to form a design
with deliberation, then the offense is lowered to the
second degree.

But

intoxication cannot

be

introduced

to excuse the crime or make it less than murder in the
second degree.
In a similar manner, evidence of intoxication, may
reduce a charge of assault with intent to kill to simple
assault.

DEGREE OF INTOXICATION NECESSARY
TO SHOW ABSENCE OF PREMEDITATION.

It

is stated in section 22, Code Criminal Procedure

that the jury may take into consideration the fact that
the accused was intoxicated at the time, in determining
the purpose, motive or intent with which he committed
the act.

The question which arises is, does intoxica-

tion always tend to show an absence of deliberation or
premeditation.

Upon consideration it

is apparent that

in some instances it might prevent a person from forming
an intent or motive, while in other

cases it would not.

The degree of intoxication, the condition of the mind of
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the person intoxicated, and other circtunstances must be
considered.

A man may be intoxicated and yet be able

to form a deliberate intent.
In the case of People vs. Fish, (125 N. Y. 136) the
rule is laid down that if the accused person be sober
enough to form an intent and so deliberate upon and
premediate the crime, then he is responsible the same as
if he had been perfectly sober, and that he is guilty
even though intoxicated.
Perhaps the best statement of the rule as it now
stands is found in the case of People vs. Leonardi,
(143 N. Y. 360) and I may be pardoned from quoting from
the opinion rendered by Judge Peckham.

He says,-- "We

do not think that under this statute the intoxication
need be to such an extent as to necessarily and actually
preclude the defendant from forming an intent or from
being actuated by a motive before the jury would have the
right to regard it as having any legal effect upon the
character of defendant's act.

Any intoxication, the

statute says, may be considered by the jury and the
decision as to its effect rests with them.

That a man

may be even grossly intoxicated and yet be capable of
forming an intent to kill or do some other criminal act
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is

indisputable,

and if,

while intoxicated,

he forms an

intent to kill and carries it out with premeditation, and
deliberation, he is without doubt guilty of murder in the
first degree.

If his intoxication made him more excit-

able and led him the more readily and easily to commit
the crime,

to form the intent and to reach a conclusion,

as the result of deliberation upon it, then his intoxication would not help him.

He must be so completely

intoxicated in order to be excused as to be destitute
of the capacity to realize the wrongful nature of his
act

;

that his acts are wholly aimless and without

purpose.
The jury should not allow intoxication to alter the
character or grade of the criminal act unless they have
a fair and reasonable doubt of the existence of the
necessary criminal purpose or intent after a consideration of such evidence of intoxication.

THE CHANGE EFFECTED BY THE PASSAGE
OF SECTION 22,

PENAL CODE.

The passage of section twenty-two of the Penal Code
completely changed the rule which had been laid down in

New York and followed up to 1881.

This fact must be

borne in mind in the study of cases which arose prior to
the passage

of this

law.

In the case of People vs. Batting, which arose in
1874, it was held that

no degree of intoxication will be

a defense to murder.

It was said that the law in such

cases does not

seek to ascertain the actual state

perpetrator's mind.
implied having been
ence

The fact from which this state is
proved, the law presumes the

of malice and intent.

exist-

Proof in opposition to this

presumption was considered inadmissible.
party could not

of the

Therefore a

show that he was so drunk as not to be

capable of entertaining a malicious feeling or intent.
The court
(86 N. Y.,

in the case of Flannigan vs. People,

554) says, "The rule is well settled that

voluntary intoxication of one who, without provocation,
commits a homicide, although amounting to frenzy, does
not exempt him from the

same

legal influences upon the

question of intent, as affecting the grade of his crime,
which are applicable to a person entirely sober."
This ruling was universally sustained prior to the
year 1881 but of course would not be followed now.

It
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is merely a matter of historic interest.

A great

majority of the states have adopted the same general
rule as that which is

found in New York at the present

time.
The laws of a number of states which differ from the
general rule will be noted below.

A L A B A M A.

A most exceptional case is found in this State in the
case of State v. Bullock, (13 Ala.413).

The defendant was

on trial for assault with intent to kill.

The Court held

that although drunkenness reduces a man to a state of temporary insanity it does not excuse his offense

committed in a

fit of intoxication, and that malice was inferred from the
character of the weapon used, which legal presumption could
not be rebutted by evidence of intoxication.

The Court

charged the jury that the drunkenness of the prisoner should
have no effect upon their consideration.
with approval in the case of

This case was cited

Beasley v.State,(50 Ala.149).

However, in the case of Ford v. State in 71 Ala. 385, it was
held that voluntary intoxication may sometimes operate to rebut the existence of malice so as to reduce the grade of
homicide, or other crime of which malice is a necessary ingredient.
The court in this case, apparently disregarding the case
in 13 Ala. 413 cited above, lays down the same general rule
as is

found in a majority of the states.

G E 0 R G I A.

The rule laid down in Georgia is that if a man, when
unexcited by liquor is capable of distinguishing between
right and wrong, and he voluntarily deprives himself of
reason by intoxication, then he is responsible for his acts
while in that condition.
A statute in this state provides that voluntary drunkenness is no excuse to crime,

and a late

case in the

applica-

tion of this statute holds that if evidence of intoxication
be allowed to lower the grade of the crime, or to lessen it in
any case whatever, it is thereby made some excuse,

and con-

sequently contrary to the spirit of the statute.

M I S S 0 U R I.

It has been held in the State of Missouri in the case of
State v. Sneed (88 Mo. 138),

that evidence of intoxication is

inadmissible, either to show that no crime was committed or
to reduce its grade from murder in the first degree to murder
in the second.

The Court says, "However differently the

question may have been decided elsewhere, we are not disposed
to overthrow the

rule thus established in this State, be-

lieving it to rest upon reason and authority, and that any
departure from it would neither be in the interest of a higher civilization, nor promotive of the best interests of soci-

ety, nor conducive to the ends of Justice."

PENNSYLVANIA.

It has been held in one of the earlier cases in Pennsylvania that intoxication is rather an aggravation than a defense of crime.

One of the later cases holds that when a

man has not the power to distinguish between right and wrong,
he is not accountable for his crimes and accordingly when intoxication is so great as to render it impossible for a man
to form any complete intention, that the lav: allows it to
reduce the grade of homicide from murder in the first to
murder in the second degree.

TENNE

S SEE.

In this state it was held in 1827 that if the person accused of murder was insane, then this would be a defense
to the crime.

But

it was held that

if this insanity arose

from drunkenness, then it would be no defense to the crime.
"Insanity which is the immediate effect of intoxication is
no excuse

; he is equally responsible for all his acts."

In 1829, a statute was passed by which murder was divided
into the first and second degrees.

Deliberation and premedita

tion was necessary to convict of murder in the first degree.
The passage of this act seems to have changed the law in
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Tennessee completely for some years later it was held that
upon a trial for murder in the first degree, drunkenness to
any extent was relevant, although the drunkenness was not so

excessive as to render the accused incapable of deliberating.
Yet if it might have excited him and produced a state of
mind unfavorable to premeditation and deliberation it was ad-

missible.

This remains the

law at the present time in that

state.

INSANITY PRODUCED BY TIM

U.Mi±

.

It is laid down in the case of Nevada v.Thompson (12 Nev.
140) that temporary insanity, produced immediately by intoxication, does not destroy responsibility when the patient,
when sane and responsible, made himself voluntarily intoxicated.
This proposition seems to

be a settled rule of law.

On the other hand, if the habit of drinking has created a
fixed frenzy or insanity, as delirum tremens, it is the

same

as if produced by any other cause, it excuses the act which
otherwise w-uld be criminal.
Supported by Lanergan v. People, 50 Barb. 266; W.Va. v.
Robinson, 20 Vr.Va. 713.

LARCENY.

While the rule as to the admission of evidence of intoxication as a defense to the crime of larceny, cannot be regarded as an entirely settled one, still the great majority
of the courts have followed the rule which is herein stated.
To prove the crime of larceny it is necessary to prove a specific intent to

commit the act charged.

If a man becomes so

drunk that he is incapable of entertaining this intent, and
in this condition, he takes another persons property, and relinquishes them before the intent could come upon him or returns them when he regains his right mind, then there is no
larceny.

From the very nature of the ofience, there must

be the criminal intent, and this cannot exist in the mind of
one who is too drunk to entertain a specific intent

of any

kind.
This proposition is supported by the following authorities :
Woods v. State, 34 Ark. 341.
Ingalls v. State, 48 Wis. 647.
People v. Walker, 38 M'ich. 156.
Bishop on Crim. Law, Vol. I, Sec. 412.
In the case of Chatham v. State (92 Ala.47) decided in
1890, defendant was prosecuted for larceny.

There being some

evidence that he was drunk when he committed the alleged
crime.

The court held that he had a right to have the jury
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pass on the evidence showing the extent and degree of his
intoxication, as affecting his mental capacity to form
the specific intent which is of the essence of the offence ; but the jury should be

instructed that his in-

toxication is no excuse, unless os excessive as to render him incapable of consciousness that he is conmmitting
the crime-- incapable of distinguishing between right
and wrong ; stupefaction of the reasoning faculty."
The latest case to be found in New York is that of
People v. Burns (33 Hun. 296).

The defendant was on

trial for larceny and the judge charged the jury that
they must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant intended to commit a crime, and that the
jury must take into consideration the intoxication of
the defendant in determining the intent with which the
defendant entered the building in question.

This de-

cision was sustained in the upper court in New York and
is according to the gener l rule as laid down in a majority of the States.

, PERJURY.

The law as to the admissibility of evidence of intoxication as a defense to the crime of perjury is
settled in New York by the case of People v. Willey,
(Park. Crim. Rep. 19.)

In this case it was held that

intoxcation could not be offered in defense to an indictment for perjury.

In this case the accused was in-

toxicated when he came before the magistrate, and obtained the warrant, at which time he made the false statements.
In the case of Lytle v. State, (31 Ohio St. Rep. 196)
perjury was charged upon the testimony given in reference
to a past transaction at the time of which the accused
was intoxicated.

It was held that the question as to

whether the accused was too drunk to form an intent to
commit the crime of perjury should have been left to
the jury.

If he was too drunk to know what he was say-

ing, or to form an intent, he could not be guilty of
violating his oath.

PASSING COUNTERFEIT MONEY.

The crime of passing counterfeit money consists of
knowingly passing it and it
to detect a counterfeit.
knowledge it

often requires much skill
To rebut the presumption of

is competent for the accused to show that

he was too drunk at the time he passed the money in
question to be able to know that
However if

it

was counterfeit.

the prosecution shows that

the accused pro-

cured the money for the purpose of passing it,

the evi-

dence of intoxication will not be allowed weight.
the case of U. S. v. Rowdenburse,
court charged that

In

(1 Bald. 514) the

if the accused was in such a state of

intoxication when he received the counterfeit

bills

as

not to know what he was receiving, then you may say that
he did not receive them as known counterfeits

; and be-

fore you can find him guilty you will require, besides
proof of his passing them as true, proof that he knew
they were false.

F 0 R G E R Y.

Intent is a necessary element

in the

crime of for-

gery, an intent to defraud is made an element by statute
in a majority of the states.

If, through intoxication,

the person accused was unable or incapable of forming
such intent,

he cannot

be held guilty.

See-- People v. Blake, 5 Crim. Law Mag. 722.
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